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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ironically, both liberal Supreme Court of the United States Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer and his conservative counterpart Justice Antonin 
Scalia proffer methodologies for statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation that recognize the risks associated with the virtually unli-
mited power and authority of an unrestrained judiciary and suggest 
applying limitations on judicial review.
1
  Both Justices agree that the 
judiciary should not legislate from the bench by substituting its views 
for those of elected legislative bodies or the electorate or imposing 
personal ideological perspectives.  Their agreement regarding the 
need to restrain jurists, however, belies the reality; jurists regularly in-
ject personal political and other ideological preferences into judicial 
decision making.  Even those who recognize the dangers of judicial 
activism promote starkly contrasting methodologies.  For example, 
while Justice Scalia maintains that the judiciary must be constrained 
by the text of the legislation, Justice Breyer promotes judicial review 
bound by the overarching principles of the U.S. Constitution.  This 
Comment argues that the absence of a uniform methodology of judi-
cial review and the regular use of methods all too likely to create con-
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 1 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005) (pointing to the desirability of restraining judicial activism 
through judicial adherence to the Constitution’s overarching goal and principle of 
assuring liberty); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW (1998) (maintaining that judicial analysis, decision making, and discre-
tion must be constrained by the actual text of the Constitution by using the meaning 
of words as understood at the time of drafting). 
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flicting results contribute to and exacerbate the very problems Justic-
es Breyer and Scalia address
2
 and thereby encourage the judicial ac-
tivism each seeks to avoid.  The recent Supreme Court decision in 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
3
 offers a compelling case 
study in the critical importance of identifying appropriate case law as 
controlling precedent and establishing a uniform methodology of 
judicial review.  Crawford reviewed a piece of Indiana legislation that 
supporters deemed necessary to prevent voter fraud and maintain the 
integrity of the voting system and that rivals argued was a gross parti-
san attempt to chill voter turnout by groups more likely to vote for 
candidates of the opposing party.
4
  The Supreme Court got this one 
wrong by manipulating and misapplying cases it deemed preceden-
tial, ostensibly reaching for a preferred outcome, and ignoring con-
trolling case law almost directly on point.  The Crawford opinion 
should serve to rally renewed debate on the wide latitude afforded to 
the judiciary in regard to judicial review and to urge the judiciary to 
embrace a methodology consistent with the core values and prin-
ciples of American democracy memorialized in the Constitution. 
Recent attempts at election reform appear to be partisan attacks 
on voting by political parties hoping to chill voter turnout of groups 
likely to vote for rival candidates.
5
  If true, these legislative actions are 
a cynical attack on the clear, unambiguous democratic goal of broad 
citizen participation established by the Constitution.
6
  In Indiana, for 
example, the restrictive election law at issue in Crawford arguably was 
a Republican partisan attempt to manipulate the outcome of elec-
tions by adopting a facially neutral law designed to disenfranchise 
groups of voters (aged, poor, and racial minorities) likely to favor 
Democratic rivals.  The Supreme Court Justices rendered four sepa-
rate opinions encompassing three distinct analyses yielding two op-
posite conclusions; no opinion adequately protects the individual, 
 
 2 See sources cited supra note 1. 
 3 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 4 David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of 
the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 484 (2008). 
 5 Brief of Professor Richard L. Hasen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
2–3, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (Nos. 7-21 & 7-25) [hereinafter Brief of Hasen]. 
 6 Over time, the American voting franchise generally has been marked by ex-
pansion of voting rights.  But repeated periods in American history have been cha-
racterized by efforts to restrict or deny the vote.  For example, after the Civil War and 
the adoption of the so-called Civil War Amendments to the Constitution, many 
Southern states and districts “used Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfa-
ther laws, and not so subtle means, such as lynchings, cross burnings, and other 
techniques to prevent newly freed slaves from voting.”  Schultz, supra note 4, at 484. 
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fundamental right to exercise the vote, but all four opinions bring to 
the forefront three critical issues. 
First, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and 
the Supreme Court applied improper precedents that should not 
have controlled review of an infringement on the right to vote, which 
is arguably the most fundamental civil liberty in a democracy.  Part II 
of this Comment provides the background to Crawford, which offers a 
compelling case study in the importance of identifying appropriate 
precedent.  Part III argues that the line of cases upon which the court 
relied in Crawford was never intended to apply to laws that actually 
preclude or abrogate voting rights; its misapplication to the case at 
issue actually empowered the courts to apply an inappropriate and 
erroneous standard for judicial review that enabled an ideologically 
based decision rather than one based on enduring legal precedent 
and core constitutional principles.  The Supreme Court replaced the 
longstanding strict-scrutiny standard customarily applied when fun-
damental rights are at stake
7
 with a flexible balancing test previously 
applied only to rules and processes that had only indirectly impacted 
voting rights without affecting the ability to vote itself.
8
 
Second, even assuming arguendo that appropriate precedents 
were utilized, the standard established by such precedents proves un-
workable and insufficient when applied to fundamental individual 
rights.  Part V demonstrates that this test, drawn largely from the sub-
jective beliefs of particular jurists, is too susceptible to conflicting ana-
lyses and outcomes and thus is likely to increase the risk of judicial 
activism and judges legislating from the bench.  The widely diverging 
results derived from application of the test evidence its failure, espe-
cially when fundamental rights are at stake.  Moreover, Part VI proves 
that the Indiana law at issue in Crawford would have failed strict scru-
tiny review because the law was too restrictive and unnecessary to 
achieve state goals. 
Third and finally, Part VII demonstrates that the Court’s ulti-
mate decision in Crawford exposes the great failure of the judicial sys-
tem—it is far too susceptible to judicial activism.  Part VII argues that 
the judiciary urgently adopt a uniform methodology of judicial review 
 
 7 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); Burdick 
v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Storer 
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); see also 
infra Part IV. 
 8 See cases cited supra note 7.  The flexible balancing test has been applied, for 
example, where states attempt to establish candidate-eligibility rules, see Anderson, 460 
U.S. 780, or to restrict the ability to vote for write-in candidates, see Burdick, 504 U.S. 
428. 
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consistent with Justice Breyer’s concepts of active citizen participation 
in shaping law
9
 that must comport with the overarching core values 
and goals inherent in the Constitution.  In the broader context of the 
integrity of the Constitution, the Crawford decision presents troubling 
ramifications for the preservation of civil rights and liberties generally 
and voting rights in particular.  Justice Scalia calls for an interpretive 
methodology that restricts jurists to an examination of the precise 
words of the text of statutes, as well as state constitutions and the U.S. 
Constitution and therefore reduces judicial analysis to mere formu-
laic choices
10
 as evidenced in his concurring opinion in Crawford.
11
  
Justice Breyer, in contrast, seeks to limit judicial activism by advocat-
ing a jurisprudence that analyzes the law’s effects and purposes as 
guided by the overarching principles and core values of the U.S. Con-
stitution—encouraging and ensuring active liberty.12  Ultimately, this 
Comment proposes that to maintain legitimacy of law as well as to 
protect individual freedom, the courts ought to remain steadfastly 
loyal to the overarching principles, core values, and framework for 
democracy that the Constitution established.  These values include 
widespread citizen participation and the maintenance of the active 
liberty that serves as the central goal of our democratic system. 
II. CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD 
In 2005, Indiana enacted Senate Enrolled Act No. 483 (Indiana 
SEA 483 or SEA 483)
13
 requiring all citizens voting in person to 
present government-issued photo identification or, subject to certain 
terms allowing provisional balloting, be barred from voting.
14
  Indiana 
 
 9 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 5–7 (stating that a judge would “view the Constitu-
tion through a more democratic lens”). 
 10 See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23–29. 
 11 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1625–26 (2008) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring) (demonstrating a willingness to mechanically analyze important 
constitutional issues concerning fundamental rights). 
 12 See BREYER, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that “[s]ince law is connected to life, 
judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, includ-
ing contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be 
affected”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 13 2005 Ind. Acts 2005.  The main provision of the Indiana law, IND. CODE ANN. § 
3-11-8-25.1 (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Special Sess.), was recently held uncons-
titutional in League of Women Voters of Ind. v. Rokita, No. 49A02-0901-CV-40, 2009 WL 
2973120, at *15 (Ind. App. Sept. 17, 2009) (“[T]he Voter I.D. law violates Indiana 
Constitution Article 1, Section 23, and must be declared void because it regulates 
voters in a manner that is not uniform and impartial.”). 
 14 League of Women Voters of Ind., 2009 WL 2973120, at *15; see also Crawford, 128 S. 
Ct. at 1613–14.  
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mandates that a “voter show identification at the polling place that 
meets four key requirements”: the identification must (1) have a pho-
tograph of the voter, (2) contain an expiration date in the future, (3) 
be “issued by the State of Indiana,” and (4) have the “full legal name 
of the voter that matches the voter registration records.”15  The re-
quirements, however, do “not apply to absentee ballots submitted by 
mail, and the statute contains an exception for persons living and vot-
ing in a state-licensed facility like a nursing home.”16  But “[a] voter 
who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed 
may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if he or she ex-
ecutes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within 
ten days following the election.”17  And “[a] voter who has photo 
identification but is unable to present that identification on election 
day may file a provisional ballot that will be counted if she brings her 
photo identification to the circuit county clerk’s office within 10 
days.”18 
After consolidating separate suits by voters and the Democratic 
Party challenging the constitutionality of the Indiana law, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant state officials,
19
 and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed.
20
  The plaintiffs alleged that although the Indiana 
law is not overtly discriminatory, it is discriminatory in effect; they as-
serted that the Republican majority in the state legislature adopted a 
law intended and likely to chill votes by the old, the poor, and those 
of racial and ethnic minorities—groups that are least likely to possess 
the financial or physical wherewithal to comply with the identification 
requirements.
21
  They also claimed that Indiana SEA 483 was de-
signed to disenfranchise precisely those voters most likely to vote for 
 
 15 Matt A. Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Indiana Voter ID Requirements 
on the Electorate 8 (Wash. Inst. for the Study of Ethnicity and Race, Working Paper, 
2007), available at http://depts.washington.edu/uwiser/ 
documents/Indiana_voter.pdf. 
 16 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1(e) (West, Wes-
tlaw through 2009 1st Special Sess.)). 
 17 Id. at 1613–14 (citing IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-11.7-5-1, 3-11.7-5-2.5(c) (West, Wes-
tlaw through 2009 1st Special Sess.)). 
 18 Id. at 1614 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b) (West, Westlaw through 
2009 1st Special Sess.)). 
 19 Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 784 (S.D. Ind. 2006), 
aff’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 20 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007), 
aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 21 Second Amended Complaint at 2, 6–7, Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d 
775 (No. 1:05-cv-00634-SEB-VSS). 
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non-Republican candidates.
22
  After all, SEA 483 is neither narrowly 
tailored nor likely to effectively reduce the problem the state pur-
ported to solve—in-person voter fraud.23  More importantly, the Indi-
ana law has a disenfranchising effect on voters, especially the elder-
ly,
24
 members of racial or ethnic minorities,
25
 and the poor.
26
 
Despite the obvious implication of fundamental constitutional 
rights, the Seventh Circuit majority used a standard highly deferential 
to the state and explained that the fewer the number of people who 
would be deprived of a right to vote by the law, “the less of a showing 
the state need make to justify the law.”27  The majority virtually ig-
nored the fact that the right to vote is an individual one.
28
  Judge 
Evans, dissenting, asserted that Indiana’s voter-identification law im-
poses a severe burden on the right to vote of some portion of eligible 
voters and, therefore, should be subject to elevated judicial scrutiny, 
which, he concluded, the Indiana law fails to satisfy.
29
  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, and in April 2008, the Court handed down 
Crawford, a six-to-three decision affirming the Seventh Circuit and 
upholding the restrictive law.
30
  A close analysis of the case and appli-
cable law, however, suggests the Court used inappropriate precedent 
and erroneously applied an ineffective standard, both of which con-
tributed to judicial activism consistent with and infected by one polit-
ical party’s agenda. 
The issue before the Supreme Court was 
the constitutionality of an Indiana statute requiring citizens voting 
in person on election day, or casting a ballot in person at the of-
fice of the circuit court clerk prior to election day, to present pho-
to identification issued by the government. 
. . . . 
The complaints in the consolidated cases allege that the new law 
substantially burdens the right to vote in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; that it is neither a necessary nor appropriate 
method of avoiding election fraud; and that it will arbitrarily dis-
 
 22 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 21, at 6. 
 23 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1636–37 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 24 See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 142, 144 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 27 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F. 3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007), 
aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 28 See id. (failing to properly recognize that the right to vote is an individual 
right). 
 29 Id. at 954 (Evans, J., dissenting). 
 30 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615 (2008). 
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franchise qualified voters who do not possess the required identi-
fication and will place an unjustified burden on those who cannot 
readily obtain such identification.
31
 
The State of Indiana, however, identified several interests to jus-
tify the burdens that SEA 483 imposes on voters and potential voters. 
First, Indiana argued that “[t]he State has a valid interest in par-
ticipating in a nationwide effort to improve and modernize election 
procedures that have been criticized as antiquated and inefficient.”32  
Indeed, 
[t]wo recently enacted federal statutes have made it necessary for 
States to reexamine their election procedures.  Both contain pro-
visions consistent with a State’s choice to use government-issued 
photo identification as a relevant source of information concern-
ing a citizen’s eligibility to vote.
33
 
Although neither the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)
34
 
nor the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)
35
 required 
Indiana to create SEA 483, they do “indicate that Congress believes 
that photo identification is one effective method of establishing a 
voter’s qualification to vote and that the integrity of elections is en-
hanced through improved technology.”36  Even so, the manifest goal 
of HAVA is to increase voter participation.
37
 
Second, Indiana asserted that the state had a problem with infla-
tion of Indiana’s voter rolls that legislators feared could lead to voter 
 
 31 Id. at 1614 (citations omitted). 
 32 Id. at 1617. 
 33 Id. 
 34 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 (2006).  Congress enacted HAVA to establish an Elec-
tion Assistance Committee to “assist in the administration of Federal elections and to 
otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain Federal election laws 
and programs, to establish minimum election administration standards for States 
and units of local government with responsibility for the administration of Federal 
elections, and for other purposes.”  Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1666 (2002). 
 35 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to gg-10 (2006).  The purpose of the NVRA was to make it 
“easier for Americans to register to vote and to maintain their registration.”  U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, About the National Voter Registration Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
crt/voting/nvra/activ_nvra.php (last visited Aug. 8, 2009).  
 36 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618. 
 37 147 CONG. REC. 28,005 (2001) (statement of Rep. Udall); see also 148 CONG. 
REC. 1213 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) (“Every American citizen—appropriate 
age, appropriate qualifications, properly registered—ought to be able to cast a ballot 
without difficulty.”); 148 CONG. REC. 1205 (statement of Sen. Dodd) (“All of us 
worked many months to develop legislation that would try to meet one central goal; 
that was to make it easier to vote in America and much harder to corrupt our Federal 
election system.”). 
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fraud.
38
  Ironically, SEA 483 addresses only in-person voter-
impersonation fraud; “the record contains no evidence of any such 
fraud actually occurring in Indiana.”39  Moreover, the plaintiffs “ar-
gue[d] that provisions of the Indiana Criminal Code punishing such 
conduct as a felony provide adequate protection against the risk” of 
future occurrences.
40
 
Last, the state asserted that it has an interest in ensuring public 
confidence “‘in the integrity and legitimacy of representative gov-
ernment.’”41  And “[w]hile that interest is closely related to the State’s 
interest in preventing voter fraud, public confidence in the integrity 
of the electoral process has independent significance, because it en-
courages citizen participation in the democratic process.”42  Despite 
such arguments, evidence that strict voter-identification requirements 
encourage democratic participation is anecdotal at best.
43
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT APPLIED IMPROPER PRECEDENTS THAT 
EMPLOY AN INSUFFICIENT STANDARD OF REVIEW WHEN A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IS IMPLICATED DIRECTLY 
To evaluate a law that concerns the right to vote (whether regu-
lating voters, voting, or candidates), the Court has applied the ap-
proach set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze
44
 and Burdick v. Takushi.
45
  In 
Anderson, an Ohio law imposed early filing deadlines on independent 
candidates
46
 and thereby only indirectly affected voters’ choices with-
out delimiting the actual exercise of the right to vote.  Rather than 
apply a litmus test, the Court required the state to identify the rele-
vant interests, which the Court then evaluated and weighed against 
the burdens imposed by the restriction.
47
  In Burdick, the Court ap-
plied the Anderson balancing approach to a Hawaiian law that prohi-
 
 38 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619. 
 39 Id. at 1618–19. 
 40 Id. at 1619. 
 41 Id. at 1620 (quoting Brief of Respondents at 53, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (Nos. 
7-21 & 7-25)). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the 
Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1750 (2008); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 631, 635 (2007). 
 44 460 U.S. 780, 787–90 (1983). 
 45 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992). 
 46 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782–83. 
 47 Id. at 789–90. 
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bited voting for write-in candidates.
48
  The Burdick Court, like the An-
derson Court before it, dealt merely with an indirect restriction upon 
voting rights by regulating write-in ballots.  Allowing “reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions,” the Court upheld the Hawaiian law.49 
The Anderson-Burdick flexible standard calls for deference to 
“important regulatory interests” in the face of “nonsevere, nondi-
scriminatory restrictions” and reserves strict judicial scrutiny only for 
laws deemed to severely restrict the right to vote.
50
  Anderson-Burdick 
establishes that “strict scrutiny is appropriate only if the burden” on 
the right to vote is severe.
51
  Legislatively imposed burdens are not 
considered severe when they are “ordinary and widespread” and im-
pose only “nominal effort.”52  When a burden is more than “merely 
inconvenient,” it is considered severe.53  To conclude that a state law 
such as Indiana SEA 483, which actually prohibits the exercise of the 
right to vote under certain circumstances, could be deemed analog-
ous to the laws at issue in Anderson and Burdick, which relate only to 
matters ancillary to citizens’ voting rights, seems incredulous and in-
tellectually dishonest.  Accordingly, these cases are improperly ap-
plied as precedents. 
Defining the Indiana law as merely affecting the voting machi-
nery or requiring only nominal efforts for compliance instead of de-
nying or threatening to deny the actual exercise of the voting fran-
chise, the Court in Crawford misapplied the Anderson-Burdick standard 
and employed a standard of review actually established for election 
laws that only indirectly or derivatively impact the right to vote.  The 
Indiana law is, however, clearly distinguishable from the laws re-
viewed in the earlier cases that applied this flexible standard.  Unlike 
the state laws in Ohio and Hawaii reviewed in Anderson and Burdick, 
respectively, and in stark contrast to the facts and limitations in those 
cases, Indiana imposes a direct burden on and a potential outright 
denial of the ability of the voter to exercise his or her fundamental 
right to vote.  The Indiana law does not merely pose a burden with 
the kind of derivative effects felt in Ohio and Hawaii; it threatens the 
very essence of the exercise of the franchise.  While time, place, and 
 
 48 Burdick, 504 U.S at 433–34. 
 49 Id. at 434, 440 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
 50 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
 51 Id. (quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005)) (alteration in orig-
inal omitted).   
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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manner restrictions can be valid, they may not be used to wholly deny 
fundamental rights.
54
  In Crawford, at issue was whether a citizen 
maintains a reasonable opportunity to cast his vote at all.  Nonethe-
less, the Court applied these cases as precedent, merely balancing 
state interests against the overall burden imposed on the electorate as 
a whole without sufficient consideration of the effects on individual 
liberties.  The Court reduced the examination to that of the relative 
impact on the electorate at large and the aggregate number of voters 
likely to suffer from restriction.  The Court disregarded the actual 
burden from a denial of the franchise for any individual, restricting 
its inquiry to a mere analysis of the steps needed to obtain the requi-
site identification card or to cast a provisional ballot. 
In Crawford, the Court overreached when it concluded that the 
line of cases following Anderson and Burdick actually rejected strict 
scrutiny of laws imposing a burden on the right to vote and replaced 
it with the “flexible standard” of Anderson.55  Justice Scalia’s concur-
rence went even further; it reduced the same line of cases to a mere 
administrative rule, characterized by a highly deferential standard 
that permits states far too much leeway in establishing voter restric-
tions.
56
  The majority opinion and Scalia’s concurrence examine the 
effects on voters generally
57
 and ignore the fact that the law directly 
threatens the individual’s right to vote. 
Although the dissent found that the law does not even satisfy 
Anderson-Burdick, the dissent was wrong to apply that flexible stan-
dard.
58
  The dissent determined that Indiana SEA 483 failed under 
the balancing test because “a State may not burden the right to vote 
merely by invoking abstract interests, be they legitimate, or even 
compelling, but must make a particular, factual showing that threats 
 
 54 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986); see also Eu v. 
S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989). 
 55 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 n.8. 
 56 Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although Burdick liberally quoted Ander-
son, Burdick forged Anderson’s amorphous ‘flexible standard’ into something resem-
bling an administrable rule.”). 
 57 See id. at 1623 n.20 (majority opinion) (“While it is true that obtaining a birth 
certificate carries with it a financial cost, the record does not provide even a rough 
estimate of how many indigent voters lack copies of their birth certificates.”).  The 
Court erred in considering only the effects on the electorate as a whole while failing 
to consider that the right to vote is an individual liberty right; the Court wrote that 
“on the basis of the record that has been made in this litigation, we cannot conclude 
that the statute imposes excessively burdensome requirements on any class of voters.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58 Id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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to its interests outweigh the particular impediments it has imposed.”59  
Moreover, in accepting the state’s interests in ensuring the integrity 
of the voting system, preventing voter fraud, motivating and ensuring 
voter participation, and maintaining the integrity of the election re-
sults, the Court did not seek proof but relied on mere belief, conjec-
ture, and anecdotes.
60
  The Court seemed to “resign itself . . . to its in-
tuition that ‘fear’ of election fraud ‘drives honest citizens out of the 
democratic process.’  This intuition, however, presents a testable em-
pirical proposition,”61 and testing was neither part of the record nor 
required by the Court before it rendered its decision. 
Empirical tests conducted by legal commentators reveal that the 
conventional wisdom that the mere perception of election fraud ac-
tually leads to voter disengagement is not supportable.
62
  Such studies 
demonstrate that perceptions of voter fraud actually have no relation-
ship to an individual’s likelihood of turning out to vote.63  Further, 
the need to preserve public confidence in elections, by itself, does 
not justify a voter-identification law that risks suppressing the voting 
right.
64
  Accordingly, before restricting the exercise of the fundamen-
tal right to vote, policymakers and jurists have the obligation to test 
the validity of the rationales for the restrictive laws: 
[B]efore jumping on the photo-identification bandwagon, poli-
cymakers should closely examine empirical data about the magni-
tude of voter fraud and the extent to which a photo-identification 
requirement would reduce participation by legitimate voters. 
While a small amount of voter fraud hypothetically could deter-
mine a close election, the exclusion of twenty million Americans 
who lack photo identification could erroneously skew a larger 
number of elections.
65
 
To be sure, other cases, in addition to Burdick and Anderson, have 
applied this flexible analysis.  In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Par-
 
 59 Id. (citation omitted).  
 60 See, e.g., Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 43, at 1739 (noting a “scarcity of 
empirical findings to settle some of the factual issues central to this debate” presents 
“risk that the Court will resign itself” to the existence of election fraud and citizens 
opting out of the democratic process as a result). 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 1750–57. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Cf. Schultz, supra note 4, at 486 (citing U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., 
THE NEED FOR NEW FEDERAL REFORMS: PUTTING AN END TO VOTER FRAUD (2005), avail-
able at http://rpc.senate.gov/public/_files/ 
Feb1504VoterFraudSD.pdf (arguing that the threat of voter fraud is real and that 
voter-identification laws are necessary to control this problem)).   
 65 Overton, supra note 43, at 634 (footnotes omitted). 
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ty,
66
 for example, the Court appropriately subjected a Minnesota ban 
on fusion candidates to a flexible standard.
67
  Electoral fusion is an 
arrangement where two or more political parties support a common 
candidate in hopes of pooling the votes so that all those parties may 
secure a controlling majority.
68
  Thus, the ban in the Minnesota law 
did not affect an individual citizen’s ability to cast his or her vote.  Ra-
ther, it was merely an indirect burden on the right to vote and was 
appropriately subject to the Anderson-Burdick standard of review. 
Similarly, a California law that required independent candidates 
to have disaffiliated from a political party at least one year before 
running as an independent was appropriately subjected to the flexi-
ble standard.
69
  In addition, the Court in Rosario v. Rockefeller
70
 used a 
flexible standard similar to the Anderson-Burdick test to uphold a New 
York law that required voters in a party primary to register with that 
party by a certain deadline.
71
  All of these cases, however, involve laws 
that create only indirect effects on voting rights.  None burdens the 
franchise directly or impacts it in the manner or to the degree that 
Indiana SEA 483 does. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS MANDATES THAT STRICT SCRUTINY BE 
APPLIED BECAUSE VOTING IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
A long line of cases provides that the right to vote is a funda-
mental one.
72
  Similarly, the Supreme Court has a rich history and 
tradition of applying strict scrutiny to laws restricting or denying fun-
damental rights.
73
  Under substantive due process, some rights are so 
 
 66 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
 67 Id. at 363–64.   
 68 Note, Political Combinations in Elections, 45 HARV. L. REV. 906, 906 (1932). 
 69 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974). 
 70 410 U.S. 752 (1973). 
 71 Id. at 761–62. 
 72 Brief of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party and Providing Applicable Legal Standard at 3–4, Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (Nos. 7-21 & 7-25) [hereinafter Brief of Cheme-
rinsky] (citing Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. 
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)). 
 73 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 (16th 
ed. 2007); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (privacy in intimate rela-
tions); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (privacy in family matters); Moore v. 
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (privacy in family matters); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy in procreation decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy in marital intimacy). 
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fundamental that a state may not restrict them without a sufficiently 
compelling interest and a showing that any imposed burden is no 
more intrusive than is necessary to achieve such interest.
74
  Judicial 
deference does not extend to laws that interfere with fundamental 
rights or discriminate against “discrete and insular minorities” and 
instead mandates a “more searching judicial inquiry.”75  Voting rights 
are indeed fundamental, and a line of precedential cases clearly is 
consistent with the longstanding application of strict scrutiny to laws 
involving denial of voting rights.
76
 
In Dunn v. Blumstein,
77
 the Court determined that state election 
laws alleged to completely deny a citizen or group of citizens the right 
to vote must be analyzed under close constitutional scrutiny, which 
requires that the state law in question be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.
78
  A state election law does not survive close 
scrutiny if the state does not have a “substantial and compelling rea-
son” for the restriction imposed by the law.79  Even then, the mere 
showing of such an interest is not, by itself, dispositive.  The statute 
must be narrowly drawn to serve that interest.  As the Dunn Court 
noted, 
[i]t is not sufficient for the State to show that [its statutory re-
quirements] further a very substantial state interest.  In pursuing 
that important interest, the State cannot choose means that un-
necessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity.  
Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with “preci-
sion,” and must be “tailored” to serve their legitimate objectives.  
And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with 
a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may 
not choose the way of greater interference.  If it acts at all, it must 
choose “less drastic means.”
80
 
 
 74 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 73, at 378.   
 75 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).   
 76 See generally Brief of Chemerinsky, supra note 72 (providing the line of cases).   
 77 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 78 Id. at 337, 343; see also Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969) 
(“[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote . . . to some . . . but denies it 
to others, ‘the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to pro-
mote a compelling state interest.’” (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969))). 
 79 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335.   
 80 Id. at 343 (citations omitted); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 
(1960) (“In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the govern-
mental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by 
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more 
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Where a state election law denies the right to vote to a certain 
group of otherwise-qualified citizens but grants the right to others, as 
in Indiana, “the purpose of the [state law’s] restriction and the asser-
tedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional 
scrutiny.”81 
The Court noted in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections
82
 that 
“since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired 
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any al-
leged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized.”83  For example, in Evans v. Cornman,84 
the Court applied close constitutional scrutiny to a restriction in Mar-
yland that denied the right to vote to individuals living on the 
grounds of a federal enclave.
85
  Further, unjustified limitations placed 
on who may exercise the right to vote compromise the very founda-
tion of our democracy.
86
  As held in Wesberry v. Sanders,
87
 “[n]o right is 
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the 
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we 
must live.  Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right 
to vote is undermined.”88 
Since the inception of our representative democracy, “the right 
to choose a representative is every man’s portion of sovereign pow-
er.”89  The cumulative effect and legacy of this line of cases is the 
judicial recognition of voting as a fundamental right, and legislative 
attempts to restrict or deny such right must be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny.  Collectively, these cases create overwhelming 
precedent that interference with or regulation of the fundamental 
right to vote, such as the direct infringement on exercising the fran-
chise permitted by Indiana SEA 483, should be subject to strict scru-
 
narrowly achieved.  The breadth of the legislative abridgement must be viewed in the 
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.”). 
 81 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 (quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970)). 
 82 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 83 Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964)). 
 84 398 U.S. 419. 
 85 Id. at 422. 
 86 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (“Any unjus-
tified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the 
selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative govern-
ment.”). 
 87 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 88 Id. at 17. 
 89 Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693 (1989) (quoting Luther v. Borden, 
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 30 (1849)). 
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tiny.  The right to exercise the franchise may be limited only if a 
compelling government interest exists and if the limitation imposed 
by government is no more burdensome than is necessary to achieve 
such a compelling interest.
90
 
The language of Anderson and Burdick and their respective prog-
eny has created confusion as to whether Dunn and its progeny still 
apply in those cases in which the state election law is alleged to com-
pletely deny the right to vote to any citizen.
91
  The strict scrutiny anal-
ysis applied in Dunn, however, remains the appropriate binding 
precedent and should be applied to cases involving any direct burden 
on voting—that is, any burden that threatens denial, undue restric-
tion, or abrogation of the right to vote.  The Court in Crawford, there-
fore, should have applied Dunn.  After all, the facts and issues at stake 
in Crawford more closely resemble those of the Dunn line of cases 
than the Anderson-Burdick line.  In addition, Dunn has not been over-
ruled, so state election laws that threaten to completely deny citizens 
the right to vote remain subject to strict scrutiny.
92
  Crawford clearly is 
a substantive due process case involving not incorporation but fun-
damental rights.
93
  Where a state election law, like Indiana SEA 483, is 
alleged to completely deny the right to vote to certain citizens instead 
of merely affecting representational interests, the mechanics of vot-
ing, or candidate eligibility, a fundamental right is threatened and 
strict scrutiny must be applied. 
Recent federal legislation seeks to make the voting power more, 
not less, accessible for America’s eligible voters.  As noted by Senator 
Dianne Feinstein and Representatives Robert A. Brady and Zoe Lofg-
ren, federal legislation, HAVA in particular, was intended to make 
the franchise easier to exercise; however, Crawford demonstrates that 
the practical implications of HAVA have made it more difficult for 
constituents to cast their ballot.  They explained that “[r]ather than 
protecting a citizen’s right to vote, Indiana has used the federal re-
 
 90 Schultz, supra note 4, at 490. 
 91 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (Wood, J., dissenting) (“[T]he panel assumes that Burdick also means that 
strict scrutiny is no longer appropriate in any election case.  As Judge Evans makes 
clear, however, Burdick holds no such thing.”), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 92 See Brief of Chemerinsky, supra note 72, at 3–6. 
 93 Although “the right to vote is not expressly protected in the United States 
Constitution,” it clearly is a fundamental right.  Samuel Langholz, Note, Fashioning a 
Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 731, 767 & n.210 (2008) 
(citing DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW 29 (3d ed. 
2004) (“[T]he right to vote in elections is a central democratic right and the act of 
voting is the most elemental form of democratic participation.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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quirement from HAVA to create an additional impediment to vot-
ing.”94  The extensive requirements set forth in the Indiana statute 
“stand as an obstacle to the execution of federal purpose and in-
tent.”
95
  Where such fundamental interests encounter interference at 
the state level, a heightened level of scrutiny is required to ensure 
that such direct barriers are reasonably necessary to serve an impor-
tant regulatory interest.
96
 
In one such case, Burson v. Freeman,
97
 state election law prohi-
bited the solicitation of votes or the display and distribution of cam-
paign materials within one hundred feet of polling place entrances.
98
  
The Supreme Court applied a strict-scrutiny analysis when the law was 
challenged on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
99
  The 
Court found the boundary restriction constitutional and held that the 
statutory provision constituted a permissible compromise between 
two competing fundamental interests—the exercise of free speech 
and the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of in-
timidation and fraud.
100
  The Court wrote that to survive strict scruti-
ny, a state must do more than assert a compelling state interest; the 
state must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted 
 
 94 Brief of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Representative Robert A. Brady, 
and U.S. Representative Zoe Lofgren as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6–7, 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (Nos. 7-21 & 7-25) 
[hereinafter Legislators’ Brief]. 
It should not be forgotten that Congress passed HAVA in response to 
egregious aspects of the administration of elections in this country that 
were exposed in the wake of the 2000 presidential elections. First and 
foremost, the goal was to protect the franchise—to make it easier, not 
harder, for every eligible citizen to vote, and to have his or her vote 
counted.  
Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 107-329, pt. 1, at 38 (2001) (“Studies of the nation’s election 
system find that a significant problem voters experience is to arrive at the polling 
place believing that they are eligible to vote, and then to be turned away because the 
election workers cannot find their names on the list of qualified voters.”). 
 95 Legislators’ Brief, supra note 94, at 7.  Although HAVA does not preclude a 
state from establishing its own election administration and technology requirements, 
the state requirements must not be “inconsistent” with the requirements established 
under HAVA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 15484 (2006).  The provisions of the Indiana statute at 
issue in this case are inconsistent with the federal requirement, as the burdensome 
requirements of the statute make it more difficult for individuals to exercise their 
right to vote, rather than easier, as HAVA intended.  Legislators’ Brief, supra note 94, 
at 6–8. 
 96 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 97 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
 98 Id. at 193–94. 
 99 Id. at 199–200. 
 100 Id. at 211. 
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interest.
101
  The Court concluded that a state has a compelling inter-
est in protecting voters from confusion and undue influence.
102
  
Upholding the state statute, the Court found that a restricted zone 
was necessary to serve the state’s compelling interest in preventing 
these evils.
103
  As to the narrowly tailored requirement, the Court 
found that widespread abuse and the persistent battle against voter 
intimidation and election fraud demonstrate that the state’s ap-
proach was appropriate.
104
  By analogy, applying strict scrutiny in 
Crawford was necessary because the Indiana law created an even more 
direct and immediate threat to a voter’s right to exercise the fran-
chise.  The Court should have continued to demand that laws that 
deny or threaten to deny completely a right as fundamental as the 
right to vote must be narrowly tailored and necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest.
105
 
V. THE ANDERSON-BURDICK STANDARD IS AN UNWORKABLE SOLUTION 
THAT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHT OF VOTING, IS HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE 
TO CONFLICTING OUTCOMES, AND ENCOURAGES JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Even if the Anderson-Burdick standard has appropriate preceden-
tial value, the test does not adequately protect the fundamental subs-
tantive due process right of voting in our democracy.  Moreover, it 
creates an unworkable solution in cases of direct limitations on vot-
ing.  As evidenced in the Supreme Court’s Crawford decision, it is, for 
example, all too likely to result in highly subjective analyses of each of 
the state interests, the extent of the burdens imposed on voters, and 
the weight and relative value assigned to each.
106
  Accordingly, its use 
creates uncertainty and conflicting results, which insufficiently pro-
tect the fundamental right to vote.
107
 
This standard also greatly heightens the risk of judges legislating 
from the bench and is inconsistent with the concept of judicial re-
straint.  Election-reform efforts by many states have become decidedly 
partisan, and reviewing courts also have been divided along partisan 
 
 101 Id. at 197–98. 
 102 Id. at 199. 
 103 Burson, 504 U.S. at 208–09. 
 104 Id. at 210–11. 
 105 Brief of Chemerinsky, supra note 72, at 15. 
 106 See generally Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 107 See Schultz, supra note 4, at 491–92. 
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lines.
108
  Many recent efforts at election-administration reform have 
become mired in partisan controversy.
109
  Generally speaking, Repub-
lican state legislators have proposed and adopted laws purportedly 
aimed at preventing voter fraud while Democratic legislators have 
proposed laws aimed at preventing voter intimidation and removing 
barriers to voting.
110
  Each party claims that the other’s proposed re-
forms are designed primarily to gain partisan advantage.
111
  The 
greatest controversy has been in the realm of voter-identification laws: 
With the exception of Arizona, which enacted its voter identifica-
tion law through a voter initiative (aimed more broadly at issues 
of benefits for illegal immigrants), every state that has enacted or 
tightened its requirements for voters to show identification at the 
polls has done so through the support of a Republican-dominated 
legislature.  Democrats have uniformly opposed the efforts to im-
pose new voter identification requirements, as in Pennsylvania, 
where the Democratic governor vetoed a new voter identification 
law passed by the Republican-dominated legislature, and in Mis-
souri, where the newly elected Democratic Secretary of State has 
opposed voter identification laws and argued against them in a 
report on the 2006 election.
112
 
Perhaps most disconcerting is not the partisan split within legis-
latures but the clearly partisan decision making among judges.  An 
unmistakable split has developed along party lines among judges de-
ciding challenges to voter-identification laws; this split reveals the 
need for appropriate application of precedent and the propriety, and 
perhaps the necessity, of a uniform judicial-review methodology.
113
  In 
Michigan, for example, the five Republican judges on the state’s 
highest court voted to uphold the state’s voter-identification law, and 
the two Democrats voted to strike it down.
114
 
In Crawford, a similar result occurred in the court of appeals.  
The majority of Seventh Circuit judges were appointed by a Republi-
can president.
115
  The dissenting judge was appointed by a Democrat-
 
 108 Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14–15 
(2007). 
 109 Id.   
 110 Id. at 18. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted). 
 113 See Brief of Hasen, supra note 5, at 15. 
 114 In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 
740 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007); see Hasen, supra note 108, at 42 n.201. 
 115 Chief Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the Crawford panel opinion for the Se-
venth Circuit, was appointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan.  See U.S. 
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ic president.
116
  With one exception, the vote denying en banc rehear-
ing split along party lines.
117
  While this does not suggest that judges 
seek partisan advantages, it does indicate that judges bring subjective 
analyses to these cases consistent with their political affiliation.  And 
that demonstrates the need for strict scrutiny and application of a 
uniform judicial review methodology. 
The Crawford case, and the application of the Anderson-Burdick 
standard, reveals a great weakness of judicial review—the absence of 
core guiding principles.  For example, instead of considering the im-
pact of the state law on the principles at the core of our democratic 
values, the Court took a highly deferential view and weighed state in-
terests over the rights of each individual voter.  Rather than encour-
aging greater democratic participation, statutes that purport to target 
voter fraud seem merely to use such fraud as “a pretext for a broader 
agenda to disenfranchise Americans and rig elections.”118  As a result, 
a high risk of disenfranchisement exists. 
VI.  APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY WOULD HAVE EXPOSED 
INDIANA SEA 483 AS TOO RESTRICTIVE AND UNNECESSARY  
TO ACHIEVE STATE GOALS 
While even the Anderson-Burdick test contemplates increased 
scrutiny under certain circumstances, given the seemingly uncontro-
versial determination that the right to vote is a fundamental one, the 
Supreme Court in Crawford erred by not applying strict scrutiny.  In-
diana SEA 483 directly restricts the power of an individual citizen to 
exercise his or her right to vote, while the precedent cases of Anderson 
and Burdick relate merely to indirect burdens such as candidate eligi-
bility.
119
 
A. Indiana’s Compelling State Interests Are Illusory 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court first would have examined 
whether compelling state reasons justify the burdens on an individu-
 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDGE CHRONOLOGY 11 
(2008), available at http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/Judges_Chronology.pdf.  Only three 
of the sixteen judges sitting on the Seventh Circuit were appointed by a Democratic 
president.  See id. at 12.   
 116 Circuit Court Judge Diane Pamela Wood was appointed by Democratic Presi-
dent Bill Clinton.  See id. 
 117 Hasen, supra note 108, at 42. 
 118 Schultz, supra note 4, at 486. 
 119 See generally Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 
(1983).  
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al’s fundamental right to vote imposed by Indiana’s SEA 483.120  As 
previously noted, Indiana’s stated reasons for enacting the law in-
cluded election modernization, preventing election fraud, and safe-
guarding voter confidence.
121
  In this case, the plaintiffs did not argue 
that the state lacked a compelling interest in preserving voter confi-
dence.  In fact, preventing election fraud unquestionably constitutes 
a compelling state interest.
122
  But notably, “[a]lthough a sizable share 
of the population believes that vote fraud commonly or occasionally 
occurs, there is little or no relationship between beliefs about the fre-
quency of fraud and electoral participation.”123  Moreover, it does not 
appear “that universal voter identification requirements will raise le-
vels of trust in the electoral process.  Such fears appear unaffected by 
stricter voter ID laws, given that individuals asked to produce ID seem 
to have the same beliefs about the frequency of fraud as those not 
asked for ID.”124  Similarly, the evidence suggesting the prevalence of 
voter fraud is illusory.
125
 
Based on the foregoing, mere acceptance of the state’s asserted 
interests as compelling is inappropriate and not sufficiently protective 
of voting rights.  The Court too readily accepted without question or 
independent evidence the State’s expressed rationales for SEA 483.  
These underlying rationales were not subjected to rigorous empirical 
analysis and verification.  To the contrary, the facts reveal that Indi-
ana did not confront a voter-impersonation-fraud problem sufficient 
to validate the compelling justification required for the resulting leg-
islation. 
B. The Indiana Law Is Not Narrowly Tailored 
Even if it demonstrated a compelling interest, Indiana did not 
prove that the law, as adopted, is necessary to achieve its goals.  The 
law will be constitutional only if the constraint on voting represents 
the least restrictive means possible.
126
  Indiana’s law applies far too 
broad a restriction relative to the reality of Indiana’s purported prob-
lems.  In addition, despite being facially neutral, the law’s actual im-
pact is to disenfranchise large numbers of otherwise qualified voters, 
especially the old, the poor, and minorities. 
 
 120 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). 
 121 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617. 
 122 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006). 
 123 Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 43, at 1759. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Schultz, supra note 4, at 531. 
 126 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343. 
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1. The Law Does Not Effectively Reduce the Problem 
Alleged by the State 
Initially, requiring a voter to show photo identification before 
casting a regular ballot addresses only in-person voter-impersonation 
fraud.  The photo-identification requirement leaves untouched the 
problems of absentee-ballot fraud, which, unlike in-person voter im-
personation, is a documented problem in Indiana.
127
  As noted in 
Dunn, the Supreme Court long has emphasized that, “as a general 
matter, ‘before [the] right (to vote) can be restricted, the purpose of 
the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it 
must meet close constitutional scrutiny.’”128  The state’s purported in-
terest in this case—the prevention of voter fraud—cannot meet that 
test.  While combating voter fraud certainly is a compelling govern-
mental interest, the law cannot be sustained merely because Indiana 
has articulated hypothetical fraud as its concern.  Indiana conceded 
that it had never prosecuted a case of voter-impersonation fraud that 
its voter-identification law would likely prevent.
129
  Further, evidence 
of prosecutions for any instances of in-person voter-impersonation 
fraud within the state is lacking.
130
 
In fact, studies demonstrate that in-person voter-impersonation 
fraud is an extremely rare phenomenon anywhere; no evidence of it, 
for example, exists in Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, or Wash-
ington State.
131
  Election fraud actually is “very rare,” is not more than 
a “minor problem,” and “rarely affects election outcomes.”132 
 
 127 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1636–37 (2008) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
 128 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 (quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970)). 
 129 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Evans, J., dissenting), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1610. 
 130 Rick Hasen, The Extremely Weak Evidence of Voter Fraud in Crawford, the Indiana 
Voter ID Case, ELECTION LAW BLOG, May 2, 2007, 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/008378.html ( “[T]here’s been a great deal of 
attention nationally from the DOJ to the question of voter fraud in recent years, and 
still almost none of it has been found . . . .”). 
 131 Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 793–94 (S.D. Ind. 2006), 
aff’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); see 
Brief of Hasen, supra note 5, at 7, 30; Brief of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU School 
of Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6–18, Crawford, 472 F.3d 
949 (No. 06-2218) [hereinafter Brief of Brennan Ctr.]. 
 132 DAVID CALLAHAN & LORRAINE C. MINNITE, SECURING THE VOTE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ELECTION FRAUD 4, 17 (2003), available at http://archive.demos.org/pubs/EDR_-
_Securing_the_Vote.pdf. 
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Voter-impersonation fraud is even less common.
133
  Virtually all 
of the evidence intending to prove that voter fraud is a major nation-
al problem has been anecdotal, unproven, disproved, or has per-
tained to a different type of fraud unrelated to the restrictions that 
the state imposed.
134
  Given that courts have the duty to determine 
the legitimacy and strength of the state’s interest,135 the state has an 
obligation to present some evidence to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
its fraud concerns.  Indiana failed in this obligation.
136
 
2. The Law Has a Disenfranchising Effect On Voters 
A significant number of Indiana voters—comprised primarily of 
elderly, racial and ethnic minority, lesser-educated, and poor resi-
dents—will face a greater burden on their ability to exercise their vot-
ing franchise because of the state’s strict voter-identification law.  
Over 12 percent of Indiana’s voting population is sixty-five or older.137  
In addition, more than five hundred thousand residents, or 8.4 per-
cent, are African American, another approximately two hundred 
thousand, or 3.5 percent, are Hispanic, and an additional 3 percent 
are foreign born.
138
  Finally, lower-income individuals earning less 
than $20,000 per year constitute 21 percent of Indiana households, 
and 18 percent of adults in Indiana do not have a high school diplo-
ma.
139
  Because the elderly, racial minorities, low-income, and lesser-
educated populations often possess fewer resources and lower levels 
of political knowledge, these groups “are more susceptible to be dis-
enfranchised through additional layers of bureaucratic regulations, 
[such] as voter identification laws.”140  The effect of this disenfran-
chisement results in an advantage for Republican candidates because 
those without identification are more likely to identify themselves as 
Democrat than Republican.
141
  Further, Democrats, more likely to in-
 
 133 Brief of Brennan Ctr., supra note 131, at 10.  
 134 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 793–94; see Brief of Brennan Ctr., supra note 131, at 
6–18 (analyzing and refuting each piece of evidence cited by the district court in 
support of its holding on the prevalence of voter-impersonation fraud). 
 135 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 136 Brief of Petitioners at 42, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 
1610 (2008) (No. 7-25). 
 137 Barreto, supra note 15, at 6. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 24.   
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clude the aforementioned groups, generally have a lower rate of 
access to photo identification.
142
 
A survey conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice revealed 
that a substantial percentage of lower-income citizens lack documen-
tation proving their citizenship.  For example, those earning more 
than $25,000 per year were found to be more than twice as likely as 
those earning under $25,000 per year to possess ready documenta-
tion of their citizenship.
143
  The Brennan Center survey reported that 
at least 12 percent of eligible voters earning less than $25,000 per 
year do not have a readily available U.S. passport, naturalization doc-
ument, or birth certificate.
144
 
Similarly, the survey showed that elderly citizens also are far less 
likely to possess the requisite identification.
145
  Using 2005 Census in-
formation, the Brennan Center found that 18 percent of citizens over 
the age of sixty-five, or approximately six million people, do not have 
current photo identification meeting the requirements of the restric-
tive law.
146
 
Like the poor and the elderly, minority citizens disproportio-
nately lack the documentation required by some restrictive voting 
laws and, therefore, will be unable to exercise their voting right.
147
  
Reportedly, 25 percent of African-Americans otherwise eligible to 
vote have no current government-issued photo identification; starkly 
in contrast, only 18 percent of white eligible voters lack the required 
documentation.
148
 
 Using 2000 census figures, a staggering 5.5 million 
adult African-Americans lack photo identification and, therefore, 
could be barred from voting.
149
 
Although opportunities exist to obtain the necessary documents 
for those without the required government-issued photo identifica-
tion, the travel costs and fees associated with obtaining such docu-
ments can be prohibitive.
150
  For example, Indiana counties will issue 
 
 142 Id. at 15. 
 143 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ 
POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 2 
(2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/ 
download_file_39242.pdf. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 3. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 143, at 2. 
 150 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1628 (2008) (Souter, 
J., dissenting). 
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a birth certificate but only upon a payment of $10.
151
  Passports simi-
larly require payment of a fee, including the costs of obtaining a copy 
of a birth certificate required to prove U.S. citizenship, as a precondi-
tion to obtaining a U.S. passport.
152
  The total fees for a passport can 
exceed $100.
153
  As a result, most voters will incur a fee simply to ob-
tain identification to be eligible to vote.
154
  In addition, travel time 
and expense to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles are unavoidable be-
cause the statutory provisions preclude use of an affidavit in succes-
sive elections.
155
 
3. Less-Restrictive Alternatives Exist 
Other state laws demonstrate less burdensome ways to achieve 
Indiana’s objective.  Indiana’s voter-identification requirements are 
the most stringent in the nation.
156
  Forty-eight states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government do not have photo identifica-
tion as a mandatory requirement for voting.
157
  These jurisdictions 
provide other, far less-restrictive means for confirming voters’ identi-
ty, and given the absence of any meaningful evidence of impersona-
tion fraud, their alternatives are adequate to prevent voter fraud.
158
  
According to one study, only three states—Georgia, Florida, and In-
diana—have photo-identification requirements that are a prerequi-
site to casting a regular ballot.
159
  Four other states prefer photo iden-
tification but allow a signed affidavit as a substitute.
160
  Eighteen other 
states require identity documentation but do not insist on photo 
identification.
161
 
Florida and Georgia have put into practice photo-identification 
requirements that are significantly less restrictive than those of Indi-
ana.  Florida, for example, has more permissible forms of photo iden-
tification; even in the absence of picture identification, a voter may 
 
 151 Ind. State Dep’t of Health, Application for Search and Certified Copy of Birth 
Record (2007), available at http://www.in.gov/icpr/webfile/formsdiv/49607.pdf.  
 152 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1631 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 1632. 
 156 Brief of Brennan Ctr., supra note 131, at 4. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, VOTER ID LAWS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/voterID.laws.6.08.pdf. 
 160 Id.  
 161 Id. 
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nonetheless vote, and the vote will be counted provided the voter’s 
signature matches the one on their voter-registration forms.
162
  Geor-
gia also accepts a broader range of underlying documentation than 
does Indiana.
163
  In addition, Georgia has a serious, concerted pro-
gram to notify voters who may lack photo identification,
164
 while Indi-
ana undertakes no such effort whatsoever.  These programs ought to 
raise skepticism about the validity of the Indiana voter-identification 
requirement. 
In addition to its extreme outlier status, a clear partisan element 
to the Indiana law exists that is masked by the cynical statements 
about reducing voter fraud and ensuring the integrity of the vote: all 
Republicans voted for the law, and all Democrats voted against it.  
Further, the law includes a punitive two-trip accommodation for in-
digents unable to obtain qualifying identification without paying a 
fee.
165
  This demonstrates the exclusionary motive because poor 
people are more likely to vote for Democrats.
166
 
VII. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CRAWFORD DECISION  
BEYOND INDIANA LAW 
The power of the Supreme Court is substantial, and decisions 
reached by it are difficult to overturn.  But individuals may take some 
recourse to reverse the effects of Crawford.  Such micro-solutions in-
clude lobbying for reversal in a subsequent case, for a constitutional 
amendment to expressly protect and ensure the right to vote, or for 
federal legislation to preempt state law and effectively reverse the de-
cision.  Alternatively, political parties and concerned constituents 
may turn to practical solutions, such as mass mobilization, to ensure 
that eligible voters obtain the requisite photo identification or are 
provided transportation and assistance.  Given the difficulty in suc-
cessfully overturning recent precedent and securing enough states to 
ratify a constitutional amendment, legislative action by Congress may 
 
 162 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.043(1), .043(2), .048(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 
2009 1st Regular Sess.).  
 163 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Regular Sess.); GA. 
COMP. R. & REGS. 183-1-20.01 (Westlaw through Aug. 2009 amendments). 
 164 Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
 165 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622 (2008) (ex-
plaining that the statute imposes a requirement that indigent voters seeking to ob-
tain documentation without paying a documentation-issuance fee travel to govern-
ment offices on two separate occasions and that the statute therefore requires such 
voters to incur travel costs and time). 
 166 Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (holding that the exclusion of a 
sector of the population because of the way it votes is constitutionally impermissible). 
SORIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  1:27 PM 
366 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:341 
be the most effective means to implement appropriate voter-
identification requirements,
167
 which ought to preserve important 
government interests without trampling upon the right to vote.  Al-
though these actions may alleviate some of the burdens on voters and 
address the current, specific problems of the Crawford case, they do 
not address the greater problem of partisan politics on the Court or 
judicial activism generally. 
Perhaps, then, the most effective long-term solution would be 
the adoption of a uniform method of judicial review.  The two most 
well-known methods are textualism and active liberty, which are prof-
fered by Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer, respectively.  Justice Scalia 
extols the benefits of textualism and originalism as interpretation me-
thodologies for judges to use in deciding statutory and constitutional 
matters.
168
  He asserts that judicial review must be limited to give ap-
propriate effect and deference to legislative power; judges, therefore, 
should rely solely on the chosen words of those who are constitution-
ally charged with creating law—elected legislators.169  Doing so, he 
maintains, requires that judges apply the precise meaning of the sta-
tutory and constitutional text as they were commonly understood at 
the time of drafting by giving effect to the context in which they were 
used.
170
  According to Justice Scalia, the regularly used common-law 
methodology encourages too much judicial discretion by invoking 
unreasonable reliance on thoughts, ideas, and debate that are not 
part of the language of the laws to which the legislators agreed.
171
  For 
example, current methodology encourages judges to supplement text 
with examination of evidence of legislative intent, history, expecta-
tions, and goals, as well as with consideration of evolving societal 
standards, perspectives, and sensibilities, to ascertain the meaning 
and effect of legislative text.
172
 
Where Justice Scalia sees the Constitution as largely fixed by its 
text, subject to amendment by citizen and legislative action at the ma-
jority’s discretion, Justice Breyer views the Constitution primarily as 
an expression of a framework for governance that is bound by under-
 
 167 Langholz, supra note 93, at 797. 
 168 See generally SCALIA, supra note 1. 
 169 Id. at 10–11 (referencing Robert Rantoul, who stated that “[j]udge-made law is 
ex post facto law, and therefore unjust. . . . The judiciary shall not usurp the legisla-
tive power, says the Bill of Rights: yet it not only usurps, but runs riot beyond the 
confines of legislative power”). 
 170 Id. at 23–29. 
 171 Id. at 17–18. 
 172 See id. 
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lying principles, the interpretation of which must be applied to ever-
changing facts, issues, circumstances, and realities.
173
  Moreover, Jus-
tice Breyer recognizes that the primary purpose for the formation of 
the U.S. liberal democracy—memorialized in the Constitution—was 
to protect and enhance individual freedom of sovereign citizens to 
participate in the government (active liberty) and to be free of go-
vernmental and majoritarian tyranny (modern liberty).
174
  Justice 
Breyer points out that the very text of the Constitution suggests that 
the Constitution’s principles are far broader than its text and in-
cludes the provision that the enumeration of some rights “shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”175  
Instead of a strict, precise, and fulsome document, the Constitution 
creates a “framework that foresees democratically determined solu-
tions, protective of the individual’s basic liberties.  It assures each in-
dividual that the law will treat him or her with equal respect.  It seeks 
a form of democratic government that will prove workable over 
time.”176 
No one simple interpretive methodology or generalized theory 
of interpretation, such as textualism or originalism, can fully capture 
the nuances incorporated by the Constitution or ensure development 
of a body of law that is consistent with our core values of democracy 
and liberty.  Instead, governed primarily by the driving goal of liberty, 
judges must rely on text, related language, legislative history, statuto-
ry and constitutional goals, tradition and precedent, and, most im-
portantly, the purposes and values that the Constitution embodies.  
Lastly, judges must consider the likely consequences of their deci-
sions.  If judges remain steadfastly loyal to the overarching principles, 
core values, and framework for democracy established by the Consti-
tution, they will maintain legitimacy of the law in a manner that does 
not subject individual sovereignty to the will of the majority and the 
captive legislature it elects. 
Justice Breyer’s methodology considers the impact of laws on the 
constitutional imperative to advance active liberty
177
 by believing that 
the greater priority should be on overall consistency to democratic 
 
 173 See generally BREYER, supra note 1. 
 174 Id. at 8–9. 
 175 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 176 BREYER, supra note 1, at 134. 
 177 Similarly, the Elmendorf brief argues that consequences do matter.  Brief of 
Christopher S. Elmendorf and Daniel P. Tokaji as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers at 2, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (Nos. 7-21 & 
7-25). 
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ideals.
178
  The consideration of active liberty methodology is far more 
likely than textualism and originalism to result in a body of case law 
that furthers, rather than inhibits, civil liberties and minority protec-
tions in a manner consistent with the goals of democratic governance 
and individual liberty.
179
  As a result, most essential liberty rights (such 
as privacy, control over one’s own body, and sexual freedom), civil 
rights for racial and ethnic minorities, and equal rights for women, 
many of which involve politically sensitive and emotionally charged 
issues that divide the electorate, have been recognized first in the 
courtroom and only later found their way into statutory law.
180
  The 
majority in Crawford engaged in judicial activism by picking precedent 
to achieve a desired outcome and ignoring precedent directly on 
point.  Justice Breyer’s “active liberty” theory, if applied, would have 
found the statute to be unconstitutional because the law seeks to re-
duce, rather than enhance, participation.  Accordingly, to ensure a 
system of law capable of timely and appropriate change, the law itself 
must continue to be developed by both legislative and judicial means. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court, by perhaps reaching for 
precedent most likely to permit its desired result, applied a line of 
cases and analyses never intended to govern the direct right to vote.  
Simultaneously, the Court ignored longstanding precedent requiring 
that state restrictions on fundamental rights be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny.  The selected line of cases applied by the Court ac-
tually empowered it to uphold a statute that directly denies the ability 
to exercise a fundamental right by relying upon a standard for judi-
cial review intended only for restrictions on voting that are indirect 
or derivative in nature.  Moreover, the solution applied proved un-
workable and resulted in disparate, starkly contrasting results that 
failed to protect the fundamental right to vote, mirrored the ideolo-
gies of the Justices rendering the opinions, and created the very judi-
cial activism and unrestrained judicial power abhorred by both Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Breyer.  In addition to being wrongly decided 
and dilutive of fundamental constitutional rights, the Crawford case 
exposes the failure of our judicial system, its susceptibility to judicial 
 
 178 See generally BREYER, supra note 1, at 21–34. 
 179 Id. at 28 (stating that the Constitution’s structural complexity was a conscious 
effort to “prevent a single group of individuals from exercising too much power, the-
reby helping to protect an individual’s fundamental liberty”). 
 180 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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activism, and the urgent need to adopt a uniform methodology for 
judicial review. 
 
